An analysis of the decentralisation framework provided for in the African Charter on the Values and Principles of Decentralisation, Local Governance and Local Development, 2014 by Ziswa, Melissa Nyaradzo Sibongile
1 
 
UNIVERSITY OF THE WESTERN CAPE 
 
FACULTY OF LAW 
 
A research paper submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of an LLM in 
Law, State and Multi-level Government 
 
Student    Melissa Nyaradzo Sibongile Ziswa 
Student number   3201018  
Mode     LLM (Structured) 
Supervisor    Dr Tinashe Chigwata 
Co-supervisor   Professor Nico Steytler 
 
Research Paper Topic: An analysis of the decentralisation framework provided for in 
the African Charter on the Values and Principles of Decentralisation, Local 
Governance and Local Development, 2014. 
 
Keywords: African Charter on Decentralisation, African Union, Intergovernmental 
Cooperation, Decentralisation, Framework, Local autonomy, Supervision 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
DECLARATION 
I, Melissa Nyaradzo Sibongile Ziswa, do hereby declare that ‘An analysis of the 
decentralisation framework provided for in the African Charter on the Values and 
Principles of Decentralisation, Local Governance and Local Development, 2014’ is 
my original work and I have properly acknowledged all the sources which I have 
used by means of references. I further testify that it has not been submitted for 
another degree or to any other institution of higher learning.  
Signed……………………………………………..  
Date………………………………………………….  
Supervisor: Dr Tinashe Chigwata  
Signature……………………………………………….  
Date……………………………………………………. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
3 
 
Acknowledgements 
First and above all, I would like to thank the Lord Almighty for his guidance and 
grace throughout my studies and research. 
I would also like to express my deepest gratitude to my supervisor Dr T Chigwata 
and my co-supervisor Prof N Steytler, for their patient guidance, encouragement, 
support, and comments of this research paper. I am also indebted to SARChI for 
funding my studies. 
Finally, I wish to thank my family and friends for their never-failing prayers, support 
and encouragement throughout my studies. You are my pillars of strength. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 
 
Dedication 
This work is dedicated to my parents who have taught me to believe. I love you mum 
and dad! 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
5 
 
 
Abbreviation and acronyms 
AU  African Union 
ICT  Information and Communication Technology 
OAU  Organisation of African Unity 
PPPs  Public-Private Partnerships 
UN  United Nations  
 
 
 
 
6 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
Chapter 1: Introduction ........................................................................................................................................ 6 
1.1 Problem statement ........................................................................................................................................ 9 
1.2 Significance of the problem ....................................................................................................................... 12 
1.3 Research question ...................................................................................................................................... 13 
1.4 Argument ...................................................................................................................................................... 13 
1.5 Literature review .......................................................................................................................................... 14 
1.6 Substantiating the argument ...................................................................................................................... 16 
1.7 Research methodology............................................................................................................................... 16 
Chapter 2: Institutional design for a developmental system of local 
government 
2.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................................................ 18 
2.2 Security of existence of local government ......................................................................................... 19 
2.3 Democratic local governance ................................................................................................................ 20 
2.3.1 Representative democracy ................................................................................................................. 20 
2.3.2 Participatory democracy...................................................................................................................... 20 
2.3.3 Accountability ........................................................................................................................................ 21 
2.4 Powers and functions .............................................................................................................................. 22 
2.4.1 Assignment of relevant significant powers and functions .............................................................. 22 
2.4.1.1 Constitutional protection of powers and functions ................................................................... 23 
2.4.1.2 Final decision making powers ..................................................................................................... 24 
2.4.2 Powers over personnel, administrative structures and procedures .............................................. 24 
2.5 Revenue mobilising and expenditure powers ................................................................................... 25 
2.5.1 Revenue mobilising measures ........................................................................................................... 25 
2.5.1.1 Taxing powers ............................................................................................................................... 25 
2.5.1.2 Intergovernmental grants ............................................................................................................. 26 
2.5.1.3 Borrowing powers ......................................................................................................................... 27 
2.5.1.4 Other resource raising measures ............................................................................................... 27 
2.5.2 Expenditure powers ............................................................................................................................. 28 
2.6 Supervision ................................................................................................................................................. 28 
2.6.1 Regulation ............................................................................................................................................. 29 
2.6.2 Monitoring.............................................................................................................................................. 29 
2.6.3 Support .................................................................................................................................................. 30 
2.6.4 Intervention ........................................................................................................................................... 30 
2.7 Intergovernmental cooperation ............................................................................................................. 31 
2.8 Defining decentralisation in context .................................................................................................... 32 
 
 
 
 
7 
 
2.9 Conclusion .................................................................................................................................................. 34 
Chapter 3: Analysis of the decentralisation framework provided for in the 
African Charter on Decentralisation 
3.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................................................ 35 
3.2 Security of existence of local government under Article 5 ............................................................ 36 
3.2.1 The existence of the institution of local government ....................................................................... 36 
3.2.2 The existence of individual local government units ........................................................................ 36 
3.3 Democratic local governance under the African Charter ............................................................... 37 
3.3.1 Democratically elected leaders .......................................................................................................... 37 
3.3.2 Participatory democracy...................................................................................................................... 38 
3.3.3 Accountability ........................................................................................................................................ 39 
3.4 Powers and functions .............................................................................................................................. 40 
3.4.1 Assignment of significant and relevant powers and functions ....................................................... 40 
3.4.2 Powers over personnel, administrative structures and procedures .............................................. 42 
3.5 Revenue generating and expenditure powers ................................................................................... 42 
3.5.1 Revenue mobilisation measures ........................................................................................................ 43 
3.5.1.1 Taxing powers ............................................................................................................................... 43 
3.5.1.2 Intergovernmental transfers ........................................................................................................ 44 
3.5.1.3 Borrowing powers ......................................................................................................................... 45 
3.5.1.4 Other resource raising measures ............................................................................................... 45 
3.5.2 Expenditure powers ............................................................................................................................. 45 
3.6 Supervision ................................................................................................................................................. 46 
3.6.1 Regulation ............................................................................................................................................. 46 
3.6.2 Monitoring.............................................................................................................................................. 47 
3.6.3 Support .................................................................................................................................................. 47 
3.6.4 Intervention ........................................................................................................................................... 48 
3.7 Intergovernmental cooperation ............................................................................................................. 49 
3.8 Defining decentralisation in context .................................................................................................... 50 
3.9 Conclusion .................................................................................................................................................. 51 
Chapter 4: Conclusion 
4.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................................................ 53 
4.2 Major findings of the study ..................................................................................................................... 54 
4.2.1 Security of existence of local governments ...................................................................................... 54 
4.2.2 Democratic local governance ............................................................................................................. 55 
4.2.3 Powers and functions .......................................................................................................................... 55 
4.2.4 Revenue mobilising and expenditure powers .................................................................................. 56 
 
 
 
 
8 
 
4.2.5 Supervision ........................................................................................................................................... 56 
4.2.6 Intergovernmental cooperation .......................................................................................................... 57 
4.2.7 Defining decentralisation in context................................................................................................... 57 
4.3 Answering the research question ......................................................................................................... 58 
4.4 Recommendation ...................................................................................................................................... 59 
Bibliography ........................................................................................................................................................ 60 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
 1.1 Problem statement 
The African Union (AU)1 is a continental intergovernmental organization of countries 
on the African continent. The Organisation of African Unity (OAU), the forerunner to 
the AU came into existence in 1963 but was disbanded, and later replaced by the AU 
which has a membership of fifty four countries.2 The AU operates through various 
institutions namely a permanent secretariat, various ministerial conferences, council 
of ministers and the Assembly of Heads of State and Government.3 The Assembly 
meets once a year and is the highest policy-making body of the AU. The goals of the 
AU include the need to ‘promote and protect human rights, consolidate democratic 
institutions and culture, and to ensure good governance and the rule of law’.4  
The Constitutive Act of the African Union (hereafter Constitutive Act)5 is the legal 
instrument that signalled the transition from the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) 
to the AU. This Act lists the promotion of democratic principles and institutions, 
popular participation and good governance6 and the promotion of co-operation in all 
fields of human activity to raise the living standards of African people7 among its 
objectives. Furthermore, it recognises the respect for democratic principles, human 
rights, the rule of law and good governance as being one of the principles that are to 
guide the AU.8 With the transition of the OAU to the AU in 2001,9 there was a great 
realisation that Africans themselves had to search for solutions to the region’s 
problems, and that any assistance from outside would have to be so tailored as to 
uphold African ownership.10 Later this idea was vigorously supported by a 
succeeding crop of African leaders such as Thabo Mbeki of South Africa, Olusegun 
                                                                
1
 Brown M & Augustine E ‘The African Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights: An Analysis’ (2014) 1 
SCSR Journal of Development 52. 
2
 ‘Member States of the African Union’ available at http://www.au.int/en/AU_Member_States 
(accessed on 4 July 2016). 
3
 Brown & Augustine (2014) 52. 
4
 Preamble Constitutive Act of the African Union, 2000. 
5
 Constitutive Act. 
6
 Article 3 (g) Constitutive Act. 
7
 Article 3 (k) Constitutive Act. 
8
 Article 4 (m) Constitutive Act. 
9
 ‘Transition from the OAU to the African Union’ available at 
http://www.au2002.gov.za/docs/background/oau_to_au.htm (accessed on 8 July 2016). 
10
 Moolakkattu J S ‘The Role of the African Union in Continental Peace and Security Governance’ 
(2010) 66(2) India Quarterly 152. 
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Obasanjo of Nigeria, Abdelaziz Bouteflika of Algeria as well as Hosni Mubarak of 
Egypt through the project of an African Renaissance.11 To realise the continental 
objectives highlighted above, the AU adopts Charters across a variety of areas such 
as trade, security and decentralisation. 
With respect to decentralisation, which is the focus of this study, the AU has adopted 
the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance12 (hereafter referred 
to as the African Charter on Democracy) and the African Charter on the Values and 
Principles of Decentralisation, Local Governance and Local Development13 
(hereafter African Charter on Decentralisation or just the Charter). Countries are to 
implement these legal instruments upon ratification. At the advent of the AU in 2001, 
most African countries were centralised and hence were prone to experience 
problems that come with centralised governance such as the unresponsive delivery 
of public services. To address such problems, the AU adopted the said two Charters 
so as to enhance the establishment of effective decentralised systems of 
government in respective countries, paying particular attention to the challenges that 
are experienced on the African continent.  
The African Charter on Democracy was adopted in 2007 at the Eighth Ordinary 
Session held in Ethiopia and it came into force in February 2012.14 This Charter 
seeks to ‘nurture, support and consolidate good governance by promoting 
democratic culture and practice, building and strengthening governance institutions 
and inculcating political pluralism and tolerance’15; as well as to ‘encourage effective 
coordination and harmonization of governance policies amongst State Parties with 
the aim of promoting regional and continental integration’16. Decentralisation is only 
mentioned once in the African Charter on Democracy. The relevant provision notes 
that State Parties shall decentralize power to democratically elected local authorities 
                                                                
11
 Louw A. H ‘The concept of African Renaissance as a force multiplier to enhance lasting peace and 
stability in Sub-Saharan Africa’ available at 
http://www.africavenir.org/fileadmin/_migrated/content_uploads/LouwAfricanRenaissanceForceMultipl
ier_03.pdf (accessed on 4 July 2016). 
12
 African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, 2007. 
13
 African Charter on the Values and Principles of Decentralisation, Local Governance and Local 
development, 2014. 
14
 ‘African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance’ available at 
http://au.int/en/treaties/african-charter-democracy-elections-and-governance (accessed on 26 
November 2016). 
15
 Article 2 (6) African Charter on Democracy. 
16
 Article 2 (7) African Charter on Democracy. 
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as provided for in national laws.17 Thus the African Charter on Democracy does not 
provide a framework for decentralisation; it merely recognises the existence of local 
government. 
The African Charter on Decentralisation on the other hand was adopted in 2014 and 
it gives particular attention to decentralisation. This Charter seeks to ‘promote the 
values and principles of decentralisation, local governance and local development in 
Africa as a means for improving the livelihood of all the people on the African 
continent’.18 International practice and literature suggests that if well designed and 
implemented, decentralisation has the potential to improve the lives of ordinary 
citizens among other ways, through improved and responsive delivery of services.19 
The Charter seeks to achieve local governance, democracy and development by 
providing a decentralisation framework that member countries should adhere to 
when drafting and implementing laws and regulations that relate to decentralisation 
in their respective countries. The decentralisation framework covers a range of 
aspects, from powers and functions of local government to the fiscal aspects as well 
as supervision and cooperation measures. Like most international instruments, 
member states of the AU will only be legally bound by the Charter once they have 
ratified it.20  
The African Charter on Decentralisation is relatively new having been adopted two 
years ago, in 2014. To date, most member states of the AU have not ratified the 
Charter due to the ratification process in many countries being cumbersome among 
other reasons.21 There is not yet a clear understanding of the meaning and 
significance of the decentralisation framework it provides. Local government has 
often been ineffective as characterised by poor political accountability among local 
                                                                
17
 Article 34 African Charter on Democracy. 
18
 Preamble African Charter on Decentralisation. 
19
 Litvack J & Seddon J ‘Decentralization briefing notes’ available at 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/WBI/Resources/wbi37142.pdf (accessed 6 April 2016). See Afonso 
A & Fernandes S ‘Assessing and explaining the relative efﬁciency of local government’ (2008) 37 The 
Journal of Socio-Economics 1947. 
20
 Article 24 African Charter on Decentralisation. 
21
 Ikubaje J & Bel-Aube N ‘Civil Registration, Vital Statistics and Effective Public Sector Governance 
and Service Delivery in Africa’ (2016) 6 Open Journal of Political Science 180. See ‘The African 
Charter on Values and Principles of Decentralization, Local Governance and Local Development 
Workshop’ available at http://www.afriquelocale.org/en/component/k2/item/474-workshop-to-develop-
an-advocacy-to-promote-the-signing-and-ratification-of-the-african-charter (accessed on 26 
November 16). 
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authorities, poor service delivery as well as unresponsiveness to local needs.22 
Because of the current ineffective state of local government, the actual impact of the 
Charter on changing governance upon coming into operation is yet unknown. This 
problem is inflated by the fact that there is no scholarly commentary on the Charter 
yet. The question thus is ‘Will the African Charter on Decentralisation materially 
change local governance on the African continent for the better?’ 
1.2 Significance of the problem  
The impact of the Charter will be great since the content of the Charter and its 
eventual implementation will determine whether its objective of improving the well-
being of the people on the African continent will be realised. If the decentralisation 
framework enshrined in the Charter is effective and its values and principles are fully 
implemented, then local governments in respective countries have greater potential 
to meet the service delivery and development expectations of their respective 
communities. Conversely, the ratification and implementation of a Charter that 
provides a weak decentralisation framework may lead to service delivery and 
developmental challenges currently being experienced on the continent being 
entrenched. Such challenges include the deepening of poverty, and the quantity and 
quality of public services that are below expected standards. 
Experiences from other countries23 reveal that if decentralised systems are 
improperly designed, it may fail to deliver on its promises. Instead decentralisation 
may undermine development, good governance and democracy. For instance in the 
1980s and 1990s, the decentralisation programmes in Argentina and Brazil 
undermined macro-economic stability due to the fact that the decentralisation 
framework was not designed appropriately.24 Likewise, in 2008, the service delivery 
failures in Zimbabwe witnessed by cholera outbreaks in high density suburbs, 
service delivery protests and depleted public infrastructure, were partially attributed 
                                                                
22
 Bratton M ‘Citizen Perceptions of Local Government Responsiveness in Sub-Saharan Africa’ (2012) 
40 World Development 516. 
23
 Fjeldstad O ‘Intergovernmental Relations in the developing world’ in Levy N & Tapscott C (Eds) 
Intergovernmental Relations in South Africa ed (2001) 145. 
24
 Fjeldstad (2001) 145. 
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to the absence of an effective framework for local government and ultimately the 
design of the decentralisation programme.25 
Therefore, the significance of the problem lies with the fact that the decentralisation 
framework provided for in the Charter determines the extent to which the objectives 
of the Charter will be realised in member countries. Thus, it is imperative to examine 
the strengths and weaknesses of the Charter to inform the ratification, policy debates 
and reform on the Charter by the AU and its member countries. 
1.3 Research question 
To achieve the desired outcome of improving the wellbeing of people on the African 
continent by enhancing the role and status of local government, the African Charter 
on Decentralisation should be designed appropriately and sufficiently. Its full 
implementation should also be underscored. The main research question which this 
study seeks to answer is: ‘Can the specific provisions of the African Charter on the 
Values and Principles of Decentralisation, Local Governance and Local 
Development actually deliver on its laudable goals?’ In answering the main question, 
the study will also answer the following sub-question: ‘What are the basic principles 
that facilitate effective local government to deliver services?’ 
1.4 Argument 
This research paper argues that the Charter furnishes provisions that are capable of 
delivering on service delivery and developmental objectives. If ratified by member 
countries and subsequently fully implemented, people’s lives in respective countries 
are likely to improve. The paper further argues that, the Charter is likely to contribute 
more towards creating effective systems of local government on the continent than 
the African Charter on Democracy26 which does not entrench decentralisation and 
merely recognises the existence of local government. Nevertheless, despite 
providing a foundation for establishing an effective decentralisation framework, the 
African Charter on the Values and Principles of Decentralisation, Local Governance 
and Local Development has its own flaws. There are a couple of countries on the 
                                                                
25
 McGregor J ‘Surveillance and the City: Patronage, Power- Sharing and the Politics of Urban Control 
in Zimbabwe’ (2013) Journal of Southern African Studies 783. 
26
 African Charter on Democracy. 
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continent with constitutions and legislation which provide for much stronger 
frameworks for decentralisation in many respects than that provided for by the 
Charter. It will be suggested that lessons should be borrowed from these countries if 
need for the reform of the Charter is identified. Lessons can also be drawn from 
countries outside the African continent for the same purposes.  
1.5 Literature review 
As highlighted above, the AU adopted the Charter on Decentralisation in 2014. 
Despite having been adopted more than two years ago, there is still no literature on 
the Charter particularly on the model for local government it provides. However, 
there is vast literature on decentralisation and the role of local government which 
focuses on Africa and beyond. Decentralisation is generally defined as the transfer of 
power, responsibilities, capacities and resources from national to sub-national 
entities of government with the aim of strengthening the ability of the latter to both 
foster people’s participation and delivery of quality services.27 An effective 
decentralised system of government is a system that is ﬁne-tuned to satisfy local 
needs and is concerned with improving the well-being of the citizens that live in 
those communities.28 Accordingly, local governments should be able to promote 
social and economic development, and deliver public services such as water and 
sewage, transport, housing and healthcare.29 The assignment of powers and 
functions to local governments under a decentralised system of government however 
vary from country to country. 
A good decentralisation framework is one in which there is neither ambiguity nor 
complexity which have been known to create openings for conflicting interpretation 
and confusion.30 A single agreed upon interpretation is essential. Thus, there is dire 
need for a sincere and genuine clarification of the meaning and boundaries of 
decentralisation. As it stands, principles of decentralisation mean different things to 
different people.31 This might lead to member states adopting the Charter differently 
in their respective countries. Therefore, for the Charter to provide for effective local 
                                                                
27
 Article 1 African Charter on Decentralisation. 
28
 Afonso & Fernandes (2008) 1948. 
29
 Afonso & Fernandes (2008) 1948. 
30
 Litvack & Seddon (1999) 14. 
31
 Nhede N ‘Devolution of power and effective governance; The Zimbabwean constitutional debate’ 
(2013) 6 African Journal of Public Affairs 40. 
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governments, it must be interpreted the same by all member states. Particular efforts 
to prepare and disseminate popularized versions of the legal and regulatory system 
must be a key part of the decentralization strategy.32  Shah and Shah33 suggest that 
the closer a representative government is to the people, the better is its likelihood of 
working.  Where it works effectively, decentralisation helps alleviate problems arising 
from central government planning in control of important economic and social 
activities.34 Decisions made with greater participation are better informed and more 
relevant to diverse interests in society than those made only by central authorities.35  
Furthermore, the fact that resources are distributed to local communities makes it 
easier for communities to manage them in an accountable and transparent manner 
such that any form of abuse of resources can easily be traced and exposed.36 With 
such prudent use of public resources, strong local institutions have the potential to 
accelerate economic growth which in turn promotes national economic 
development.37 
Nevertheless, poorly designed decentralisation frameworks can result in pitfalls such 
as: local governments prioritizing local development at the expense of national 
development;38 lack of capacity of local governments to perform;39 duplication of 
services as a result of poor communication between different levels of government40 
and exacerbation of corruption at the local level.41 These challenges can be 
addressed through supervision programmes42 as well as sound cooperative 
governance43 systems between the different levels of government. However, De 
                                                                
32
 Litvack & Seddon (1999) 14. 
33
 Shah A & Shah S ‘The New Vision of Local Governance and the Evolving Roles of Local 
Governments’ in Shah A (Ed) Local Governance in Developing Countries World Bank (2006) 3. 
34
 Litvack & Seddon (1999) 6. 
35
 Litvack & Seddon (1999) 8. 
36
 Litvack & Seddon (1999) 6. 
37
 Nhede (2013) 37. 
38
 Fjeldstad (2001) 145. 
39
 Koelble T & Siddle A ‘Institutional complexity and unanticipated consequences: the failure of 
decentralization in South Africa’ (2014) 21 Democratization 1117. 
40
 Steytler N & Fessha Y ‘Defining Provincial and Local Government Powers and Functions’ (2007) 
124 SALJ 329. 
41
 Koelble & Siddle (2014) 129. 
42
 McGregor (2013) 785. 
43
 Woolman S & Roux T ‘Cooperative government and intergovernmental relations’ in Woolman S & 
Bishop M (Eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa (2013) 14 (6). 
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Visser argues that the requirement for supervision should be balanced with the need 
for local autonomy.44 
As mentioned above, no scholars have interrogated the African Charter on 
Decentralisation. This paper seeks to fill this knowledge gap by contributing towards 
a better understanding of the Charter by identifying the strengths and weaknesses of 
the decentralisation framework it provides. Thus, the argument being put forward in 
this paper is original. The overall objective of this paper is to facilitate policy debates 
around decentralisation in Africa and the development of an effective regional 
instrument on decentralisation that enhances the role of local government on the 
continent. 
1.6 Substantiating the argument 
This study is divided into four chapters. Chapter 1 is the introductory chapter which 
provides the problem statement, significance of the problem, research question, 
argument, literature review and the methodology of the study. Chapter 2 is a 
theoretical discussion of the basic features of an effective decentralisation framework 
which is informed by international literature on decentralisation and international 
‘best’ practice on the role of local government. The chapter also borrows from 
international and regional instruments (for example the European Union) which have 
provided model frameworks for decentralised government. The reason for such an 
enquiry is to understand the model provided by the Charter through developing a set 
of design features for an effective decentralisation framework on the basis of which 
this paper will evaluate the Charter’s potential to reach its objectives. Chapter 3 
examines whether the various provisions of the Charter propel local governments 
towards delivering better services, improving the wellbeing of communities as well as 
being more accountable and responsive to local needs. Chapter 4 will then provide 
major conclusions and recommendations. 
1.7 Research methodology 
This research is a desktop study. For chapter 2, the paper draws on secondary 
sources such as journal articles, chapters in books and books relating to 
                                                                
44
 De Visser J Developmental Local Government: A Case Study of South Africa (2005) 39. 
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decentralisation. In chapter 3, the focus is on the primary source- the African Charter 
on Decentralisation, Charters preceding it and legislation from different countries, 
member states and beyond. There will also be reference to case law discussing how 
the law of multilevel governance has been implemented in various countries. In 
drawing important lessons from various countries, the study will also make use of a 
thematic comparison research methodology where certain themes linked to 
decentralisation rather than jurisdictions are compared. 
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CHAPTER 2: Institutional design for a developmental 
system of local government 
2.1 Introduction 
As defined in chapter 1, decentralisation is the transfer of authority and 
responsibilities from national to sub-national entities such as local governments.45 
Local government is the lowest tier of government that is most in contact with 
communities than the other spheres, because it is usually responsible for the 
administration of basic services.46 Decentralisation has been adopted for a number 
of objectives linked to service delivery, development, democracy, conflict resolution 
and peace.47 International literature suggests that only appropriately designed 
decentralisation programmes have the potential to realise those goals.48 The 
purpose of this chapter is to propose an institutional design for a decentralisation 
programme that is capable of realising benefits usually associated with 
decentralisation. This proposed institutional design will provide a yardstick for 
examining the model for local government provided for by the African Charter on 
Decentralisation. International literature also suggests that the design of a 
developmental system of local government should protect the existence of local 
government and provide democratic governance at the local level. Furthermore, local 
government should be assigned significant and relevant powers as well as revenue 
generating and expenditure powers. The design should also empower the national 
government to supervise the local government. Moreover, it should provide 
mechanisms that foster cooperation among governments. Last, when designing a 
decentralisation programme it is important to take into account different contexts and 
environments that exist within and beyond countries. These basic features of a 
developmental system of local government will now be discussed in detail.  
                                                                
45
 Litvack & Seddon (1999) 2. 
46
 Dugger A ‘Local Government’ available at http://study.com/academy/lesson/what-is-local-
government-definition-responsibilities-challenges.html (accessed 1 December 2016). 
47
 Litvack & Seddon (1999) 4-5. 
48
 De Visser 63. See Hatchard J, Ndulo M & Slinn P Comparative Constitutionalism and Good 
Governance in the Commonwealth (2004) 9. Litvack & Seddon (1999) 6. 
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2.2 Security of existence of local government 
The security of existence of local governments is twofold. First, it pertains to the 
guarantee to exist which the institution of local government has, whether as a sphere 
or tier of government. It is important to guarantee the existence of the institution of 
local government since local governments are unlikely to perform effectively if the 
existence of the institution is in constant jeopardy from higher authorities, which may 
abolish the institution at any time.49 For instance, the absence of security of 
existence deters local governments from having long-term developmental goals 
which are crucial for development.50 Constitutional recognition of local government 
provides the highest level of security to the existence of the institution of local 
government given the cumbersome procedures involved when amending a 
constitution.51 This is partially the reason why the United Nations Guidelines on Local 
Authorities (UN Guidelines on Local Authorities) strongly recommend that the 
institution of local government be acknowledged in the constitution.52  
Second, security of existence also means that each local government unit should 
have a certain measure of protection. Local government units are also unlikely to 
perform effectively if they are in danger of being amalgamated and abolished or if 
their boundaries can be altered arbitrarily.53 Thus, certain mechanisms of reducing 
this arbitrariness become important. International best practices suggest that the 
procedures to be followed when establishing, abolishing or altering the boundaries of 
a local unit should be clearly provided for in legislation.54 These procedures should 
be complied with in practice. The role of independent bodies in the establishment, 
abolishment or demarcation of boundaries of local units is strongly encouraged to 
reduce the possibility of these governance processes from being entirely a political 
                                                                
49
 ‘Early election cancels referendum on local government’ available at 
http://councilreferendum.com.au/ (accessed on 26 November 2016). 
50
 Saunders C ‘Constitutional recognition of local government in Australia’ in Steytler N ed The place 
and role of local government in federal systems (2005) 57. 
51
 Hatchard, Ndulo & Slinn (2004) 197. 
52
 Article C 1 (1) United Nations International Guidelines on Decentralisation and the Strengthening of 
Local Authorities, 2007 (hereafter UN International Guidelines on Decentralisation). 
53
 Saunders (2005) 58. 
54
 S 4 (a) Municipal Demarcation (South Africa) Act 27 of 1998. See Local Government (Scotland) Act 
1973. See S 55 Local Democracy, Economic Development and Construction (England) Act 2009. See 
Article 5 European Charter of Local Self-Government, 1985 (hereafter European Charter of Local 
Self-Government). 
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process.55 The participation of concerned local authorities and communities is also 
paramount to allow them to influence these governance processes which have direct 
or indirect implications on their operations and lives, respectively.56  
2.3 Democratic local governance 
The basis of a developmental local government is democratic local governance 
where communities are substantially involved in local governance processes. 
Democratic local governance means that there is representative democracy, 
participatory democracy and measures to enhance all forms of accountability.57  
2.3.1 Representative democracy 
Political leaders at the local government level should be elected, among other 
objectives, to promote their accountability to local people.58 Leaders appointed by 
officials at higher levels of government tend to be accountable to those who 
appointed them instead of being accountable to the local communities they deliver 
services to.59 Elections should be conducted according to an electoral system that 
guarantees regular, free and fair elections.60 However, elections alone do not 
necessarily guarantee democratic local governance. Thus, there is need for other 
mechanisms of promoting democracy at the local level. 
2.3.2 Participatory democracy 
Communities should also be afforded opportunities to participate in local governance 
matters between elections.61 Such participatory democracy is important in a number 
of ways.  For instance, participatory democracy strengthens relations between the 
citizens and the state.62 It can also be an effective mechanism of checking on the 
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use of administrative authority.63 Thus the UN guidelines on Local Authorities state 
that participation through inclusiveness and the empowerment of citizens should be 
an underlying principle in decision-making, implementation and follow-up at the local 
level.64 Participatory democracy is on-going communication between local authorities 
and communities, as well as active involvement through associations, public 
consultation procedures, petitioning and complaints.65 Where possible, communities 
should be afforded opportunities to directly address committee meetings of local 
governance institutions. For example in the Netherlands, citizens can speak at 
committee meetings of local councils.66 In order to realise meaningful participation, 
communities should be provided with full, timely and easily accessible public 
disclosure of resource allocation decisions in budgets, procurements and 
expenditure programmes, among other areas.67   
2.3.3 Accountability 
The degree to which local officials are accountable to their constituents determines 
whether decentralisation produces the intended benefits, that is, more efficient and 
responsive services.68 Accountability generally means being answerable for one’s 
actions or lack thereof.69 At the local level, accountability refers to the expectation 
that municipalities are called on to justify their actions or lack thereof to their 
respective communities.70 Physical proximity of local government makes it easier for 
citizens to hold local officials accountable for their performance.71 That is so because 
it is easier to go and demand services at local municipality offices instead of going to 
the provincial or national offices that might be hundreds of kilometres away. The 
administrative establishment of local units should be accountable to elected local 
structures to ensure that local policies and objectives are enforced by local units.72 
Mechanisms that further enhance accountability include audits, reports, performance 
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assessments as well as evaluations of both politicians and the administration.73 
There should also be transparency and easy access to information to enable 
communities to monitor the performance of local government effectively and to react 
appropriately to that performance.74  
2.4 Powers and functions 
A decentralised system of government which upholds democratic local governance 
is likely to be ineffective if local governments are not equipped with certain powers 
and are not in charge of defined responsibilities.75 This argument entails that what 
local governments can achieve depends on the powers and functions they have.76 
Thus, local governments should be equipped with a variety of powers including the 
powers to make and implement laws and policies that have an impact on the well-
being of the citizens. The question is what nature and extent of powers should be 
assigned to local government in order to maximise the potential of decentralisation?  
2.4.1 Assignment of relevant significant powers and functions 
Municipalities should be assigned relevant significant powers and functions because 
without them they cannot be responsive to people’s needs and the developmental 
potential of local governments is negated.77 The principle of subsidiarity of the UN 
International Guidelines78 may be useful when allocating powers and functions to 
local government. The principle state that public responsibilities should be exercised 
by those elected authorities, which are closest to the citizens.79 If the principle is 
followed, among other considerations, local government is likely to be allocated 
powers and functions which are relevant to a developmental mandate including: land 
use planning, primary health, sanitation, water and electricity.80 For example 
Portugal’s municipalities are responsible for improving primary matters that deal with 
the well-being of populations residing in the municipality’s jurisdiction.81  Similarly, in 
Uganda, elected representatives at the village level hold substantial responsibilities 
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in education, health and local infrastructure.82 It is only when municipalities are 
afforded these relevant responsibilities that the notion of development, driven at a 
local level can really take root.83 It is also important that these powers and functions 
be as clear as possible. These powers must not be ambiguous as that can result 
among other things in diminished accountability and resource wastage.84  
2.4.1.1 Constitutional protection of powers and functions 
 Decentralised powers and functions are often recentralised, especially by national 
governments of a substantial number of African countries.85 The objectives for such 
recentralisation differ across the continent but in the majority of cases 
recentralisation seems to be driven by political considerations. For instance, the 
recentralisation of water and sanitation services in Zimbabwe was driven by the need 
to leave the opposition parties with less power and influence in urban areas.86 Such 
recentralisation often cripples local government especially when it involves functions 
that are pertinent to local revenue mobilisation.87  It is against this background that 
some scholars have argued that it may be necessary to constitutionally recognise 
the powers and functions of local government so as to safeguard them.88 This 
secures local governments’ existence as such powers and functions cannot be 
recentralised or modified without following procedural requirements for constitutional 
amendments.89 Even though international literature is not conclusive on the 
constitutional protection of local government powers and functions,90 modern African 
constitutions91 have recognised local powers and functions to a varying degree. In 
these constitutions the rights and responsibilities of all spheres of government, the 
description and the role of key institutions and the basis on which the powers and 
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functions of local government may be established or changed, are explicitly 
recognised,92 hence providing significant safeguards to local powers and functions. 
2.4.1.2 Final decision making powers 
While the protection of local government powers and functions is vital, equally 
important is the need to equip local government with final decision-making powers.93 
What is the purpose of having a variety of responsibilities if local government lacks 
the necessary final-decision making power over its competencies? It is difficult to 
imagine that local governments can be responsive to the particular needs and 
preferences of its respective communities without such powers.94 Hence, local 
governments should have final decision-making powers.95 Further, the powers of 
local government should not be undermined or limited by another sphere except as 
provided for by the law.96 Moreover, such limitation must not negate or stifle the 
developmental potential of local government.97 The objective as stated in the 
European Charter on Local Self-Government is to ensure that local government has 
full and exclusive powers.98 
2.4.2 Powers over personnel, administrative structures and procedures 
Local governments should also have authority over their respective human resource 
establishments.99 They should be empowered to hire and fire administrative 
personnel in order to engender the accountability of local administrative officials to 
the local political structures, among other objectives.100 If these officials are 
appointed by higher officials, they are more inclined to further the interests of higher 
authorities at the expense of local priorities.101 Municipalities should also be flexible 
enough in its own internal administrative structures and procedures so as to adapt 
these to local needs and to ensure effective management.102  
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2.5 Revenue mobilising and expenditure powers 
The assignment of relevant and significant powers and functions to municipalities is 
not enough for local governments to improve the wellbeing of local communities. 
Local governments require financial autonomy to execute those powers and 
functions without having to excessively depend financially on other spheres.103 
Financial autonomy encompasses both revenue mobilising and expenditure powers.  
2.5.1 Revenue mobilising measures  
2.5.1.1 Taxing powers 
Local governments should be assigned taxing powers with significant revenue 
mobilisation potential to ensure financial sustainability as well as to engender local 
accountability.104 Municipalities should be able to administer taxes on services 
rendered, for instance property tax, user charges, stadium taxes, business licence 
taxes and other local licences.105 Furthermore, municipalities should have the power 
to determine the tax rates so as to give them flexibility to adjust the tax rates in line 
with economic developments.106 Nevertheless, the national government should 
retain the power to set the framework within which the power to determine tax rates 
can be exercised.107 Such regulatory powers are important to ensure that local fiscal 
autonomy does not adversely affect macro-economic stability and undermine equity, 
among other objectives.108 
It is also important to ensure that ‘local tax bases are real as revenue powers without 
tax bases are hollow powers’.109  The size of local governments is likely to enhance 
the quality of the tax base. For instance, the German municipal merger programmes 
in the 1960s and 1970s produced greater financial viability.110 Thus, when 
demarcating municipal boundaries it is important to ensure that the size of local 
jurisdictions promotes financial viability of each local government. 
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2.5.1.2 Intergovernmental grants 
Locally generated revenue should be complemented by intergovernmental grants to 
address vertical and horizontal fiscal imbalances which are common in any 
decentralised system of government.111 Intergovernmental grants to address vertical 
imbalances are transfers that fund services that local governments provide on behalf 
of the central government.112 Grants which address horizontal inequalities help to 
address the imbalances in fiscal capacity due to differences in the productiveness of 
tax bases in different local jurisdictions, among other reasons.113 The goal is also to 
ensure comparable levels of service provision across the country in line with equity 
goals.114 Litvack and Seddon note that an intergovernmental fiscal framework ought 
to be fair, equitable, transparent and participatory.115 To cater for those principles, 
some countries have established independent bodies to advise the division of 
revenue between spheres so as to improve fairness, equitability, transparency and 
participation.116 For example, the Financial and Fiscal Commission in South Africa is 
consulted before the division of revenue to make recommendations to government 
on the equitable division of revenue among spheres.117 
Having the criteria for equitable sharing of revenue enumerated in the constitution 
also improves the objectiveness of the intergovernmental fiscal system and a 
predictable formula of sharing revenue, which is derived from the criteria, multilayer 
frameworks or projections of sharing revenue also help to ensure predictability.118 
The constitutions of South Africa, Uganda and Zimbabwe have entrenched the 
criteria for equitable sharing to improve objectivity and predictability.119 Having 
platforms for local governments to participate in the determination of an 
intergovernmental grant is one way of making an intergovernmental fiscal framework 
participatory.120 
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2.5.1.3 Borrowing powers 
Borrowing is another way to generate revenue which should be available to local 
governments. Loans are an important instrument of mobilising revenue especially 
when municipalities intend to spread costs of investments over long periods of 
time.121 Borrowing powers encourage long-term investments in public infrastructure 
that are crucial to the realisation of developmental goals.122 However, only 
municipalities with the capacity to repay loans should be allowed to borrow money. 
Furthermore, borrowing powers should be exercised under firm budget constraints 
so that municipalities do not borrow excessively with the expectation that the central 
government would bail them out if they fail to repay the loans.123  The bailing out of 
local governments endangers fiscal policies designed to ensure national financial 
stability.124 Thus, there should be clear regulations stating that municipal loans are 
internal obligations of municipalities and not of any other sphere.125 The mere 
possibility of a central government bailout can prompt excess spending and deficit 
financing at the local level. Brazil, where the central government had assumed over 
$100 billion in state debt between 1989 and 1997, is a clear example.126 The result 
was macro-economic instability which undermined national and local interests. 
2.5.1.4 Other resource raising measures 
Besides the sources of revenue discussed above, municipalities should be allowed 
to mobilise revenue through other measures such as Public-Private Partnerships 
(PPPs). PPPs are long-term contracts between private parties and government 
entities to provide public services or assets.127 These partnerships can be used by 
local governments to accumulate resources especially over long periods of time. 
PPPs are recognised as effective ways of delivering value for money public 
infrastructure or services.128 However, legislation should regulate profit motives 
usually associated with private bodies as that could result in high prices, fees or 
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charges relating to access to certain public goods and services.129 This adversely 
affects communities, especially the poor; resulting in the growth of inequalities in as 
far as access to public service is concerned. 
2.5.2 Expenditure powers 
The ability of local government to adjust expenditure programmes to meet local 
needs and requirements significantly relies on the discretion it has to spend 
resources.130 Local expenditure powers have an important bearing on the extent at 
which benefits associated with decentralisation can be realised. Hence, it is 
important to ensure that local government is assigned significant expenditure 
powers.131 Not all intergovernmental grants should be earmarked as that leaves local 
government with no discretion to spend transferred grants.132 While some can be 
earmarked, others should not, especially grants meant to address horizontal 
imbalances.133 Furthermore, revenue mobilised locally should ideally cover local 
expenditures as determined by local authorities and not to finance priorities 
determined by higher levels of government.134 
2.6 Supervision 
The design features discussed above emphasises the importance of local autonomy 
in a developmental system of local government. The unregulated exercise of local 
autonomy can lead to unintended results such as incapacity, corruption and 
nepotism.135 Moreover, the protection and promotion of certain national and local 
goals requires that local autonomy be limited and checked by higher levels of 
government.136 Therefore, a balance should be struck between the need for local 
autonomy and the requirement for supervision. Municipalities should be supervised 
by other spheres of government to ensure that there is compliance with regulations 
and to assess whether local governments are performing their functions. Central 
governments are also likely to afford greater autonomy to local government if they 
have the necessary mechanisms to correct problems that may arise at the local 
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level.137 Supervision serves two purposes: it should be designed to ensure that local 
governments comply with the constitutional, legal and policy framework; and it 
should be performance-focused, with the objective to ensure that local governments 
deliver on the performance targets set.138 Supervision can generally be categorised 
into four forms; regulation, monitoring, support and intervention.139  
2.6.1 Regulation 
The national government should retain the power to set the regulatory framework 
within which local governments exercise their functions.140 For example, the central 
government should set regulatory frameworks for the establishment of governance 
structures and procedures, set the minimum requirements for key managerial 
positions and should comprise of national norms and standards relating to service 
provision, for instance, water quality.141  This framework should however not go to 
the core of the functions because it would violate local autonomy which is vital for a 
developmental local government.142 It should also be predictable as it is essential in 
the rule of law; it would be difficult for local governments to comply with regulations 
that are constantly changing.143 Financial regulation is particularly important in order 
to address vices such as corruption and nepotism.144 
2.6.2 Monitoring 
Monitoring pertains to the establishment of mechanisms to assess local 
government’s performance and compliance within the regulatory framework. Higher 
levels of government should monitor municipalities. Monitoring can be achieved 
through various ways, namely through having municipalities submit periodical reports 
or reviews stating the progress in performance to the higher levels of 
governments.145  Fiscal monitoring mechanisms can be in the forms of auditing 
financial books and systems of local government as well as periodical visits to 
municipalities.146 It is also important that the monitoring mechanisms are not too 
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intrusive,147 for instance, a requirement for the local government to submit weekly 
performance reports to provinces might result in municipalities focusing more on 
compiling reports instead of delivering services to communities. Thus, monitoring 
must be reasonable and respect local autonomy. 
2.6.3 Support 
 After setting the regulatory and performance framework in terms of paragraph 2.6.1, 
a developmental framework for local government then monitors how local 
government is complying or performing in terms of that framework. If the monitoring 
mechanisms reveal problems then support should be offered. Support should be 
provided to all local governments but it is particularly important to poorly-resourced 
local governments who usually lack the capacity to comply or/-and perform.148 
Support should be tailor-made for each local government depending on the particular 
area that the municipality needs to be supported in. To protect local autonomy, it is 
important that the support be given in a manner that reinforces the decision-making 
capabilities of local governments.149 Support can be in the form of refresher training 
courses, capacity building as well as the deployment of staff and resources.150 The 
intergovernmental grants discussed in paragraph 2.5.1.2 also act as financial 
support for local governments. Support with respect to financial management is also 
crucial in improving the capacity of local units to manage and report on the 
expenditure of its financial resources.151 
2.6.4 Intervention 
If the monitoring and support mechanisms suggest persistent problems at the local 
level that threaten the attainment of national and/or local goals, it may be necessary 
for the national government to intervene at the local level.152 Intervention is the most 
extreme form of supervision thus, intervention powers must be limited, the grounds 
for intervention must be explicitly provided for in law, and last, there is need for 
oversight on the use of intervention powers.153 Intervention powers ought to be 
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regulated in such a manner that local autonomy is protected as intervention can be 
abused for political reasons.154  
2.7 Intergovernmental cooperation 
While autonomy and supervision are regarded as cardinal principles that should be 
infused in a system of decentralisation, De Visser notes that intergovernmental 
cooperation should be the third principle that strengthens the decentralisation 
framework.155 Intergovernmental cooperation is important because the assignment of 
powers is unlikely to provide exclusive compartments of powers and functions of 
each tier of government. There will be overlaps in the assignment of powers and 
function among governments.156 As such, different spheres of government should be 
able to cooperate with each other and address challenges such as resource wastage 
and lack of accountability that comes with overlapping of powers. Furthermore, there 
are instances where the different spheres of government need to deliver as one 
government, thus there is a need for intergovernmental cooperation.157  
In South Africa, intergovernmental cooperation refers to a relationship of equality 
where the different governmental spheres in intergovernmental relations operate as 
equal partners.158 The South African Constitution provides that different spheres 
should cooperate with one another in mutual trust and good faith by coordinating 
their actions and legislation with one another.159 Thus there is need for the 
establishment of an intergovernmental relations framework with the objective to 
enhance cooperation among governments. Such a framework should also provide 
for alternative dispute resolution mechanisms to be used to resolve disputes that 
may arise among governments.160  
Mechanisms such as consultations, joint-planning and joint-implementation of 
programmes and policies can be effective in promoting cooperation and reducing 
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disputes among governments, and unions must be used to promote cooperation.161 
Furthermore, the realisation of certain development goals requires strategies that go 
beyond municipal boundaries.162 For that reason, the intergovernmental relations 
framework should facilitate horizontal cooperation and formation of partnerships 
among municipalities to stimulate cooperation and remove hurdles to the integration 
of policies.163 Local government associations play a crucial role in presenting a 
unified voice of local government when engaging other spheres concerning matters 
that affect local government.164 Lastly, in order to retain the elements of open 
communication, flexibility and creativity, it is suggested that intergovernmental 
cooperation structures should neither be too formal, nor should the procedures be 
too legalistic.165 
2.8 Defining decentralisation in context 
A decentralisation programme should be tailored to meet the particular local 
environment given the differences in geography, demography, levels of disparities, 
local customs and disparities within and between countries, especially on the African 
continent. Thus, a one-size-fits-all approach is strongly discouraged given the acute 
rural-urban divide in most parts of Africa owing to aspects such as colonialism and 
apartheid. The result is that urban and rural areas have unequal resource raising 
potential due to the different levels of economic development.  Subsistence 
agriculture is assumed to be the principal activity of most rural populations whereas 
urban dwellers engage in industrial production and services.166  Rural areas continue 
to be largely impoverished with a weak state presence that is almost completely 
irrelevant as a provider of services.167  The economic disparities are further 
exacerbated by skilled workers who shun rural areas. This gravely contributes to 
capacity constraints in rural areas.  
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Hence, these different levels of capacity and financial disparities between urban and 
rural areas must be taken into account when designing a decentralisation 
programme. For instance, when assigning powers and functions to local 
governments as discussed in paragraph 2.4, the capacity of local government units 
to perform such functions should be a key consideration. High category urban 
municipalities should be assigned more powers and functions since they are more 
likely to have the capacity to perform them more effectively. Conversely, 
municipalities in rural areas should be assigned fewer powers and functions given 
that they generally tend to have limited capacity to perform. It is also important to 
have supervision measures specially tailored for the different levels of municipalities 
given the differences among them. 
Traditional authorities are still relevant in a number of African countries where they 
form the immediate level of government.168  Thus, when designing a decentralisation 
programme for areas that are under traditional leadership, it is important to recognise 
the role of traditional leadership. The institution has its drawbacks namely; the 
irrevocable corruption of the institution due to the involvement with oppressive 
colonial administrations,169 undemocratic nature,170 and their application of 
oppressive, exploitative and discriminatory customary laws.171 Nevertheless, despite 
these drawbacks, the role of traditional authorities remains crucial. Simply excluding 
traditional leadership in local government may come at a cost. For example, in 
Mozambique, the failure to recognise traditional authorities contributed partly to the 
sixteen-year civil war.172  In Zimbabwe when certain decision-making powers of 
traditional leaders were taken away and granted to democratically elected leaders, 
tensions arose and this inhibited development in rural communities between 1980 
and the mid-1990s.173  Traditional leaders are vital in enhancing the legitimacy of 
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rural local governments because they provide the link between the people and the 
government.174 Therefore, a decentralisation programme has to be designed paying 
particular attention to the local environment taking into account issues such the rural 
and urban divide and the relevance of the institution of traditional leadership.   
2.9 Conclusion 
The potential of decentralisation to improve service delivery and realise other goals 
linked to development and democracy is determined amongst other things175 by the 
design of the decentralisation programme. Basic features of a developmental system 
of local government were identified and discussed in this chapter. It was argued that 
there is need to guarantee the existence of local government. The importance of 
democratic local governance to such a system was underscored. The developmental 
programme should ensure that municipalities are assigned significant powers and 
functions. There should also be supervision measures in place to ensure that local 
governments perform and comply with set laws, policies, standards and norms. The 
framework should also provide for intergovernmental cooperation. Lastly, it is 
important to design the decentralisation framework paying attention to the different 
local environments.  
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CHAPTER 3: Analysis of the decentralisation framework 
provided for in the African Charter on Decentralisation 
3.1 Introduction 
The African Charter on Decentralisation was inspired by the Yaounde Declaration 
which was adopted by the African ministers in charge of Decentralisation and Local 
Development in their respective countries.176 The Yaounde Declaration stresses the 
importance of a participatory democracy where local communities, groups and 
organisations can deliberate about their own needs, develop their own programmes 
for change and influence policy processes to respond to those needs.177 The Charter 
has two predecessors: the African Charter for Popular Participation in Development 
and Transformation178 (hereafter African Charter for Popular Participation) and the 
African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance179. What the African 
Charter on Decentralisation has in common with its predecessors is the objective to 
promote and strengthen good governance through the institutionalisation of 
transparency, accountability and participatory democracy.180 It is however unique in 
that it is the first to entrench a decentralisation framework linked to the need to 
realise the values and principles of decentralisation as a means of improving the 
livelihood of all African people.181 The preceding charters only made reference to 
decentralisation without providing a model framework for local government.  
The purpose of this chapter is to establish if the model for local government provided 
in the Charter is capable of realising the objectives of the Charter given that the 
potential of decentralisation partly depends on its design. The evaluation of the 
model for local government provided in the Charter is carried out against the 
background of design features for a developmental local government proposed in 
chapter 2. The structure of this chapter will follow more or less the same structure 
provided for in the preceding chapter. 
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3.2 Security of existence of local government under Article 5  
3.2.1 The existence of the institution of local government  
 The decentralisation framework proposed in chapter 2 highlights the importance of 
protecting local government as an institution against recentralisation and removal of 
local government as a sphere. As proposed in chapter 2, constitutional recognition of 
local government provides the highest safeguard.182 Article 5 of the Charter provides 
that ‘State parties shall enact domestic laws/regulations, recognising different levels 
of government’.183 Thus, the Charter provides some degree of protection to the 
institution of local government. Nevertheless, that protection is not the highest 
safeguard of the institution of local government which is essential in ensuring that 
communities reap the benefits associated with decentralisation. For instance, in India 
before the passage of the 73rd and 74th amendments of the constitution that 
introduced the constitutional protection of local governments, states could dissolve 
local governments and take over their powers.184 Some countries on the African 
continent have gone beyond the mere recognition of local governments in domestic 
laws. The constitutions of Namibia185, Zimbabwe186 and South Africa187 recognise 
local governments as a separate sphere/tier of government. These respective 
constitutions offer higher protection to the existence of the institution of local 
government than what is prescribed by the Charter. Therefore, the Charter does not 
provide for adequate protection of the existence of the institution of local 
government. 
3.2.2 The existence of individual local government units 
The institutional design proposed in chapter 2 also stresses the importance of 
recognising the existence of individual municipalities besides that of local 
government as an institution. Article 5 (3) of the Charter provides that ‘geographical 
boundaries of areas falling within the jurisdiction of local governments…shall be 
modified in accordance with the provisions of the law’.188 Furthermore, Article 5 (4) of 
the Charter states that ‘…local authorities shall be consulted through clearly defined 
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regulations on…legal instruments, sectoral policies, programmes, or projects that 
directly or indirectly affect their competencies…’189 Hence, the Charter affords a 
certain measure of protection to individual local government units since the 
modification of boundaries would be modified only in terms of the law. Furthermore, 
local authorities would be consulted when there is the establishment, 
disestablishment, demarcation of boundaries and name changing of individual local 
government since such actions would most likely affect the competencies of 
municipalities. However, the protection is inadequate because the Charter does not 
take into account procedural safeguards such as the consultations and participation 
of communities, traditional leaders and the use of an independent body to protect the 
existence of local government units. The South African constitutional and legislative 
provisions provide more significant safeguards to the existence of each municipality. 
South Africa has put in place regulations detailing the participatory role of 
communities and traditional authorities in the establishment, disestablishment, 
demarcation of boundaries and name changing of local government.190 Furthermore, 
there is provision of the role of an independent body in the above processes.191 The 
involvement of all interested parties ensures that there is no erratic abolishment or 
redefinition of municipalities thus providing an adequate measure of security of 
existence for each municipality. Therefore, the absence of provisions for 
mechanisms that protect the existence of individual local government units in the 
Charter leaves local government units vulnerable to being arbitrarily abolished or 
merged with other municipalities. 
3.3 Democratic local governance under the African Charter  
3.3.1 Democratically elected leaders 
It was contended in chapter 2 that a developmental system of local government is 
one in which local leaders are elected regularly and under an electoral system which 
guarantees free and fair elections. The Charter upholds this notion of representative 
democracy. Article 5 (2) requires that local governments should be managed by 
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democratically elected representatives.192 Furthermore, Article 12 (2) of the Charter 
upholds democracy as the foundation of local governance which should take place in 
a representative form.193 Article 8 (3) of the Charter also provides that the role of 
elected authorities be at the centre of the decision-making process even after they 
have consulted non-elected parties such as cultural or religious groups.194 Moreover, 
Article 13 (1) requires that the elections of local public officials are to be enshrined in 
legislation clearly defining the modalities and timeframes of the elections.195 State 
parties are also mandated to promote regular, democratic, free, fair and transparent 
local government elections in Article 13 (2).196 Therefore, from those provisions, it 
can be argued that the Charter sufficiently provides a foundation for democratic local 
governance. 
3.3.2 Participatory democracy 
As argued in chapter 2, communities should participate in local government matters 
in between elections. Participatory democracy includes consultations, discussions, 
lobbying, actual participation in municipal meetings,197 as well as electronic 
participation198. The Charter mandates local public officials to represent the interests 
of communities on an on-going and regular basis through clearly specified 
mechanisms and timeframes.199 Furthermore, the Article 13 (3) of the Charter 
requires the communities’ duty and right to participate to be guaranteed in national 
legislation.200 The Charter also extends community-based participation to include the 
private sector and civil society.201 Article 12 (5) of the Charter also requires local 
authorities to facilitate meaningful participation.202 The Charter does not go into the 
detail of how meaningful participation is to be facilitated but as proposed in chapter 
2, local governments of member countries should ensure that meaningful 
participation is about informed participation that influences results.  The participation 
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of communities is imperative as it ensures that citizens have a continuous 
mechanism of influencing decision-making and the local officials are continuously 
reminded of the needs and preferences of their citizens. 
Furthermore, the Charter encourages innovative and convenient ways of 
participation through the use of information and communication technology to 
encourage local residents and communities to provide feedback to their elected 
representatives.203 This is of importance especially in urban areas which is more 
likely to have infrastructure and easier access to the internet. However, this is a 
challenge in respect of rural areas in most African countries where there is still a 
need to develop infrastructure.204  
The Charter also encourages those in the diaspora to participate in local 
government.205 Over the years, Africans in the diaspora have contributed in various 
ways towards the local economic development of Africa. In 2010, the remittances 
paid by Africans in the diaspora stood at $51.8 billion compared to the roughly $43 
billion in overseas development assistance and other types of foreign aid funds.206 
The fact that Africans in the diaspora contribute that much towards the economic 
development of Africa goes to show that they also have the capacity to contribute 
towards local governance and development. Beside the issues of finances, Africans 
in the diaspora also have the potential to provide technical expertise and innovative 
ideas. That said, the developmental framework provided for in the Charter promotes 
participatory democracy which should improve local governance in the continent. 
3.3.3 Accountability 
It was argued in chapter 2 that mechanisms should be put in place to ensure that 
politicians and administrators in local government are accountable to their electorate, 
higher levels of government as well as their fellow associates within local 
government. Mechanisms of promoting representation and participation, discussed 
above, contribute towards creating accountable governments at the local level. 
Accountability is crucial because it determines how efficient and responsive local 
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authorities will be in the delivery of services.207 The importance of accountability at 
local level is recognised in the Charter. Article 11 (f) provides that local authorities 
should be accountable to local communities when making and implementing local 
development decisions and policies as well as when they manage financial 
resources.208 Furthermore, Article 14 (2) of the Charter mandates local governments 
to publish and make accessible to communities, annual local government 
performance reports and disclose financial statements in full.209 The performance 
reports and financial statements enable communities to assess the conduct of public 
officials and hold them accountable. Therefore, it can be observed from the 
discussion above that the Charter provides a sufficient foundation for democratic 
local governance. Thus the Charter will improve local governance for the better in 
this regard. 
3.4 Powers and functions 
3.4.1 Assignment of significant and relevant powers and functions 
It was contended in Chapter 2 that decentralised powers and functions should be 
protected with the highest level of protection being offered by the constitution. It also 
stressed the importance of the principle of subsidiarity in ensuring that local 
government have relevant powers as the principle of subsidiarity informs the 
assignment of powers and functions between governments at different levels. 
Furthermore, municipalities should have final decision making powers. Lastly, 
chapter 2 proposed for the clear demarcation of local government powers to reduce 
among other things ambiguity, overlapping and resource wastage. 
Article 5 (2) states that ‘…local authorities shall in accordance with national law, 
have the powers to…’.210 Hence the Charter protects to a certain degree the 
decentralised powers and functions of local governments. Nevertheless, this 
protection is inadequate for the provision of better services by local governments. 
Constitutional protection provides a better safeguard because constitutional 
protection ensures that the powers and functions of local governments are not 
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dependent on the politics of the day, as parliaments that enact domestic laws are 
political bodies.211 Therefore, the Charter does not adequately protect local 
government powers and functions from dangers such as recentralisation.  
Article 6 of the Charter recognises the principle of subsidiarity as it states that 
‘central governments are to create enabling conditions for the decision-making…and 
implementation to take place at lower levels of government where local authorities 
offer a better guarantee of pertinence and efficacy’.212 The fact that the Charter 
recognises the principle of subsidiarity is commendable. The principle of subsidiarity 
enhances economic efficiency since it enables local governments to provide goods 
more efficiently to the public as compared to central governments.213 Thus with 
regard to the principle of subsidiarity, the Charter makes provision for a framework 
that informs the assignment of powers and functions to improve efficiency in the 
delivery of services. 
Article 5 (1) of the Charter provides that ‘state parties shall enact domestic 
laws/regulations, recognising different levels of government with the mandate to 
exercise their competencies…’.214 The Charter provides for the assignment of local 
government powers to exercise their mandates but there is no explicit provision of 
relevant significant powers which are essential in improving the well-being of 
communities as discussed in chapter 2. That said the Charter does not sufficiently 
provide for a developmental framework for local government that improves the well-
being of citizens in as far as the assignment of relevant significant powers is 
concerned. 
The Charter does not provide for final decision making powers either because Article 
5 (1) of the Charter requires municipalities to exercise their competencies within the 
clearly regulated mechanisms. The Charter does not provide whether the exercise of 
this power comprises of final decision-making powers. A developmental design 
without final decision-making powers is inadequate as has been experienced in 
Zimbabwe. Despite municipalities in Zimbabwe having significant and relevant 
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powers and functions, they have been unable to be responsive to the needs of local 
communities because some of the policies and decisions they make on behalf of 
their communities are not approved by the central government which has final 
decision-making powers.215 Thus, it can be noted from the above discussion that the 
Charter does not provide an adequate foundation for the assignment of powers and 
functions. Therefore, local governance is unlikely to be improved with regard to the 
assignment of powers and functions. 
3.4.2 Powers over personnel, administrative structures and procedures 
As argued in chapter 2, a developmental system of local government is also one that 
affords municipalities the authority over the human resources as well as the 
administrative structures and procedures. Having authority over personnel ensures 
that the personnel are accountable to local authorities and enables local 
governments to mould or adjust its respective administrative structures and 
procedures to meet local needs and environments. The importance of administrative 
authority at local level is recognised in the Charter. Article 16 (1) (b) states that 
national legislation should empower municipalities to determine and manage local 
public administration such as personnel and administrative procedures.216 Thus the 
Charter acknowledges that the assignment of powers to local governments over 
human resources ensures effective and enhanced delivery of quality and affordable 
services to local communities.217 Therefore, the Charter makes provision for the 
improvement of local governance on the continent through its provision of 
administrative powers. 
3.5 Revenue generating and expenditure powers 
It was argued in chapter 2 that what local governments can achieve partially depend 
on the resources they have and the freedom they have to spend mobilised revenue. 
Thus, it is important that local governments are assigned revenue mobilisation 
measures as well as expenditure powers. Revenue mobilisation mechanisms are 
crucial for municipalities to effectively deliver on service delivery obligations and 
developmental mandates, whilst expenditure powers are vital, if local governments 
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are to be responsive. In this section, the paper will examine the Charter with an 
objective of establishing if it will improve local government in as far as revenue 
mobilisation and expenditure of revenue is concerned. 
3.5.1 Revenue mobilisation measures 
Revenue can be mobilised through taxes, intergovernmental transfers, borrowing 
loans and public-private partnerships.  
3.5.1.1 Taxing powers 
It was contended in chapter 2 that municipalities can generate revenue through 
taxes, and hence should be assigned taxing powers among other matters, on the 
services they provide as well as immobile taxes such as property tax, user charges 
and local licences. Local governments should also be empowered to determine the 
taxes rates so as to sufficiently provide revenue for municipalities. Moreover, central 
governments should also ensure that the tax bases are viable by merging poor and 
wealthy regions together into more viable municipalities as discussed in chapter 2.  
The Charter acknowledges the importance of taxing powers in mobilising revenue. 
Article 7 (1) of the Charter provides that ‘central governments should adopt 
legislation, measures and establish relevant mechanisms that empower local 
governments to mobilise…resources at the local level’.218 Furthermore, Article 7 (5) 
requires local authorities to encourage and ensure that civil society, private sector, 
communities; national and sub-national entities pay local taxes.219 The Charter also 
provides that the administration of taxes is supposed to be conducted in a 
transparent manner as central government should be consulted.220 However, the 
Charter does not explicitly state the need to assign the power over tax rates to local 
government. The implication of this is that the potential of local governments to 
sufficiently raise revenue is hindered as they cannot effectively determine how much 
revenue they want to mobilise from the taxes. Furthermore, the Charter does not 
explicitly provide for the need to have viable tax bases. The challenge with this is 
that local governments will not be able to mobilise sufficient revenue if they have the 
tax powers without the tax bases to mobilise the revenue from. Therefore, the 
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provision of the assignment of taxing powers in the Charter is unlikely to fully realise 
the potential of local governments to mobilise revenue through taxes. 
3.5.1.2 Intergovernmental transfers 
As argued in chapter 2, intergovernmental grants are crucial in addressing vertical 
and horizontal imbalances that are found in any decentralised system of 
government. To effectively serve this purpose it is important that the 
intergovernmental fiscal system be transparent, objective, predictable, equitable and 
participatory. The crucial role of intergovernmental grants has been recognised by 
the Charter. Article 7 (2) provides that  ‘central governments are charged with 
creating the necessary oversight and evaluation mechanisms that ensure that the 
percentage of revenue collected at the national and local levels are effectively 
transferred to local governments for local economic development’.221  The Charter 
also upholds the principle of transparency and predictability as it states that both 
conditional and unconditional transfers from the central government to local 
governments ought to be transparent and predictable.222 The Charter in Article 16 (4) 
(c) also provides for the equitable redistribution of resources since it states that 
‘Central governments shall be responsible to equitably redistribute natural resource 
benefits acquired from natural resource exploitation in given localities and 
communities to all sub-national governments and local communities’.223 An element 
of objectiveness can also be deduced from Article 16 (4) (c) because all communities 
(despite them being negatively affected by the rural-urban divide as discussed in 
chapter 2) are to benefit from wealth accumulated in other regions or communities. 
Furthermore, local governments also get to participate in the division of revenue 
among the different spheres of government since Article 5 (4) of the Charter provides 
that local authorities should be consulted on policies that affect them.224 The division 
of revenue clearly affects local governments because intergovernmental grants 
compliment locally mobilised revenue. Therefore, the intergovernmental fiscal 
framework provided in the Charter provides an adequate foundation for the transfer 
of intergovernmental grants that seeks to improve the state of local governments in 
Africa. 
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3.5.1.3 Borrowing powers 
It was proposed in chapter 2 that municipalities with the capacity to repay loans 
should be allowed to borrow so that they are in a position to mobilise additional 
resources required for development programmes. The exercise of borrowing powers 
should be regulated and hard-budget constraints should be implemented to prevent 
any negative consequences on the macro-economic environment. The Charter 
recognises the need for local government to be allowed to borrow funds to finance 
their development priorities. Article 16 (5) (f) of the Charter requires the regulation of 
local government borrowing powers.225 The Charter leaves it to state parties to 
determine the form of regulation, including the implementation of hard budget 
constraints. The Charter however stresses the importance of ensuring financial 
sustainability of local governments.226 The implementation of a hard-budget 
constraint is one of the mechanisms required to ensure financial sustainability of 
municipalities. Thus the Charter provides the bedrock of local government borrowing 
powers that ensures that local government can generate revenue without negatively 
affecting the macro-economic stability of African countries. 
3.5.1.4 Other resource raising measures 
Chapter 2 proposed that municipalities should explore other revenue-raising 
avenues such as public-private partnerships (PPPs). It is important that PPPs be 
regulated by central governments to avoid among other reasons inequity in service 
delivery because the involvement of the private sector might result in some citizens 
not being able to afford basic services. Article 7 (3) of the Charter provides that 
central governments are to promote private sector and community development 
investments.227 Thus the Charter should be commended for having recognised the 
need to allow local government to explore other revenue sources other than the 
traditional sources of taxes and grants. It will go a long way in infrastructural 
development and other long-term investments by municipalities. 
3.5.2 Expenditure powers 
Expenditure powers entail that local governments have the final decision with regard 
to how they spend their revenues. For example, there is no need for local 
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government to seek the approval of the central government before implementing a 
budget. Expenditure discretion may be promoted by limiting the number of grants 
which are earmarked for certain purposes. However, some grants should be 
earmarked to promote certain national and local objectives such as equity.  The 
Charter gives local governments significant expenditure powers. Article 16 (5) (h) 
states that local authorities shall identify and establish mechanisms and processes 
for the efficient or optimal use of financial resources in the delivery of quality 
services.228 Furthermore, the Charter entrusts local governments with discretionary 
powers to manage financial resources at the local level.229 Therefore, the Charter 
guarantees sufficient expenditure powers, a development which is likely to improve 
local governance on the continent.  
3.6 Supervision 
The ability of local government to deliver on developmental goals, public services 
and good governance does not only rely on the protection of local governments, the 
enhancement of local democratic governance, and the assignment of significant and 
relevant powers and functions. It also relies on effective supervision by higher 
spheres of government. Supervision is essential in assessing whether municipalities 
are complying with the constitutional legislation and policy framework as well as if 
they are performing according to the standards set. Thus it was argued in chapter 2 
that higher levels of government must supervise these lower governments to protect 
certain local and national goals.  Four forms of supervision: regulation, monitoring, 
support and intervention; were identified. It was however argued that supervision 
powers should be regulated, limited and exercised subject to oversight in order to 
protect local autonomy. The question is whether the Charter provides the necessary 
supervision measures and the relevant limitations thereof? 
3.6.1 Regulation 
Supervision means that higher level governments regulate local government by 
setting a framework that does not go to the core of the powers and functions of 
municipalities. Furthermore, the regulatory framework should provide a predictable 
regulatory environment for local governments to exercise local government 
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functions. The Charter provides for the establishment of such a regulatory 
framework. Article 5 mandates member states to enact regulations that clearly define 
the regulatory mechanisms that should guide local governments.230 However, the 
Charter fails to provide that the regulatory framework should not only be clear but it 
should also be appropriate, that is, limited to frame setting and not going to the core 
of local government powers and functions. Otherwise the minimum level of local 
autonomy required for local government to deliver on development, among other 
goals, will be compromised. The regulatory framework that goes beyond framework 
setting may lead to central governments micromanaging local functions with only a 
limited knowledge of local conditions.231  
3.6.2 Monitoring 
As contended in the previous chapter, higher levels of government should monitor 
local government to assess the performance and compliance of local governments. 
This monitoring role is recognised by the Charter. Article 16 (5) (b) provides that 
central governments shall ensure, through oversight, that allocated financial 
resources are managed effectively and efficiently without undermining the principle 
of local financial autonomy.232 Moreover, there is also central government oversight 
for locally generated revenue.233 Article 14 of the Charter also provides for 
monitoring mechanisms in respect of the publication of annual performance 
reports234 as well as monitoring mechanisms to combat corruption235 and monitor 
different standards of ethical behaviour.236 Therefore, the Charter adequately 
assesses the performance and compliance of local governments to improve the 
functioning of municipalities by making provision for the monitoring of various 
aspects such as; the expenditure of revenue, performance of local authorities and 
monitoring against unethical and corrupt behaviours. 
3.6.3 Support 
Higher levels of government should provide support to local government. Support is 
particularly necessary to nascent and poorly-resourced local governments who often 
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struggle with both financial resources and capacity to perform effectively. The need 
for support to local government is recognised in the Charter.  Article 16 (3) of the 
Charter provides that municipalities should be supported through capacity 
development workshops which ensure that local governments periodically get 
training which is essential for the sphere to deliver their mandates.237 The Charter 
also provides for technological, software and administrative support.  Article 16 (2) 
provides that ‘local governments shall be provided with the required human 
resources and Information and Communication Technology (ICT) to effectively and 
efficiently discharge their responsibilities’.238 The Charter stipulates that local 
governments should also receive financial support through the intergovernmental 
grants discussed above. It is submitted that the Charter makes provision for 
adequate support to improve African local governments.  
3.6.4 Intervention 
When monitoring mechanisms discussed above reveal problems at local levels, 
higher levels of government should be able to intervene to address those problems. 
Given that intervention is the most intrusive form of supervision as argued in chapter 
2, there is need to regulate and limit the exercise of intervention by having oversight 
mechanisms over intervention powers. The Charter is silent with regards to 
mechanisms that regulate the use of intervention powers. This is detrimental as 
interventions can undermine local autonomy unjustifiably, expose municipalities to 
politically motivated interventions, and there can be arbitrary interventions given that 
the grounds for interventions are not explicitly limited.  The Charter does not also 
provide for oversight mechanisms on the use of such intervention powers. Well-
designed oversight mechanisms provide safeguards to local autonomy by limiting 
and regulating the use of intervention powers. Oversight mechanisms are crucial if 
municipalities are to perform effectively. For instance, local governments in Nigeria 
have not been able to perform optimally because of the overbearing nature of the 
central government in interventions.239 Furthermore, without oversight mechanisms, 
local governments are deprived of judicial review which local governments can resort 
to if they are of the opinion that a particular intervention is unlawful. 
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Hence, the supervision provisions in the Charter (or lack thereof), fail to adequately 
guarantee the autonomy of local government. This has implications such as 
politically motivated interventions that can weaken democratic local governance 
since the electorate can end up being unjustifiably governed by local authorities they 
did not elect. While the Charter’s provisions for regulatory mechanisms are 
lukewarm, the Charter is silent on the regulation and limitation of intervention powers 
with regard to oversight and protection of local autonomy. Nevertheless, the Charter 
has a sound decentralisation framework in respect of monitoring and support 
mechanisms.  
3.7 Intergovernmental cooperation 
Intergovernmental cooperation complements the principles of autonomy and 
supervision. Intergovernmental cooperation mechanisms enable local governments 
to engage with other levels of government to among other reasons clarify roles when 
there is overlapping of powers and functions and there is need for different spheres 
of government to deliver as one government. Cooperation may be enhanced among 
other things by creating an intergovernmental relation framework. As argued in 
chapter 2, it may be necessary to provide for the role of organised local government 
to facilitate effective engagement between local government and higher levels of 
government.  
The Charter provides for intergovernmental cooperation that creates a viable and 
effective local government system. The Charter requires that the developmental 
design ought to provide environments that encourage cooperation between different 
levels of government.240 Furthermore, the Charter provides that local governments 
should be consulted on national or sub-national legal instruments, sectoral policies, 
programmes, or projects that directly or indirectly affect their competencies.241 The 
communication is not one-way since local authorities should also involve all relevant 
spheres in the development and implementation of local development plans and 
programmes.242 Horizontal cooperation among local governments is also recognised 
in the Charter through the provision of a legislative policy and institutional framework 
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that is conducive for municipal cooperation. The Charter provides that legislation 
should recognize the right of municipalities to form a national association.243 Article 
17 (7) requires central governments to encourage and support local government 
associations.244 Associations facilitate the cooperation of local government with other 
spheres of government. For instance, the Association of Municipalities of Burkina 
Faso and the Uganda Local Government Association are examples of associations 
that facilitate intergovernmental cooperation through playing an intermediary role 
between municipalities and the central government as well as through advocating for 
the interests of local government and lobbying for their inclusion in decision-making 
processes at the national level.245 Therefore, the Charter sufficiently provides for an 
intergovernmental relations framework that helps improve the effectiveness of local 
government.  
3.8 Defining decentralisation in context 
It was argued in chapter 2 that when designing a decentralisation system, it is 
imperative to define decentralisation in context given the differences in local 
environments, capacity levels, and the role and relevance of customs and traditions. 
The Charter recognises that environments differ from one place to another within 
and beyond countries. Article 8 (1) states that municipalities are to exercise their 
powers having regard to local realities, values, and customs as well as national 
principles, norms and standards.246  The fact that local governments are mandated 
to exercise their authority with regard to local realities and values entails that the 
design of local government systems in respective countries should consider factors 
such as the rural-urban divide as this is a local reality that cannot be ignored in most 
parts of Africa.247  The Charter also provides that historically marginalised groups 
and poor communities in both rural and urban areas should be included and given 
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priority in service delivery.248 Thus the Charter should be commended for requiring 
the consideration of disparities in the delivery of services, among other things.  
The Charter does not however expressly give recognition to the role of traditional 
leaders given their role and relevance in a number of countries in Africa. There are a 
number of provisions of the Charter in which their role in local governance can 
nonetheless be inferred. This inference can be drawn from Article 8 which mandates 
local governments to implement projects or initiatives after having recognised the 
cultural, religious and gender diversity of the people within its territory in urban and 
rural areas.249 The fact that local authorities have to recognise cultural diversity can 
be inferred to mean that traditional leaders would need to be consulted in the 
decision-making processes of the projects or initiatives since traditional leaders form 
part of the culture of most rural settlements.250 The challenge is that traditional 
leaders are key governance structures in Africa whose role in local government 
should be explicitly recognised.251 The African Charter on Democracy which is the 
African Charter on Decentralisation’s predecessor expressly recognised the role of 
traditional leaders.252 Given this recognition of traditional institutions in the earlier 
instrument, the express role of traditional authorities should have not just been 
recognised in the African Charter on Decentralisation, but developed further in 
particular their relationship with modern-day state structures.  
3.9 Conclusion 
The AU should be commended for putting forward the Charter on Decentralisation in 
a bid to improve local governance on the continent. This Charter requires democratic 
local governance, the assignment of relevant powers to local government, the 
decentralisation of resources raising powers to the local level and the transfer of 
intergovernmental grants to local governments. It further requires that municipalities 
be afforded the authority to determine their personnel and administrative structures 
and procedures. The Charter also requires that there be supervision of local 
governments as well as cooperation between the different spheres of government. 
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All these requirements will undoubtedly improve local government on the continent. 
The biggest weaknesses of the Charter are that it does not offer the highest 
safeguard to the institution of local government, individual local government units or 
the assignment of significant and relevant powers and function. The Charter does 
not also provide for the assignment of final-decision making powers. Furthermore, 
the Charter does not provide supervision forms of regulation and intervention. The 
role of traditional leaders in local government is also not provided for in the Charter 
despite its significance. 
  
 
 
 
 
53 
 
Chapter 4: Conclusion 
4.1 Introduction 
Over the years, the AU has adopted a number of charters to address problems being 
experienced on the African continent. The African Charter on the Values and 
Principles of Decentralisation, Local Governance and Local Development was 
adopted to help curb problems such as poor service delivery, underdevelopment and 
poor representation of communities that usually come with centralised systems of 
government. The Charter seeks to act as a catalyst for decentralisation towards 
improving the livelihood of all the people on the African continent.253  
The primary objective of this research paper was to assess the model for local 
government provided by the Charter. In particular, the paper sought to establish if 
this model is capable of realising the objective of improving the lives of the people on 
the African continent through improved delivery of public services, among other 
ways. In chapter 2, the paper proposed an institutional design for a developmental 
system of local government which has the potential to realise benefits associated 
with decentralisation. This proposed institutional design was informed by 
international best practice, instruments and literature on decentralisation and the role 
of local government. Chapter 3 then assessed whether the Charter will improve local 
government on the continent. In particular, the chapter sought to establish if the 
Charter provides the basic features of a developmental system of local government 
proposed in chapter 2. The manner in which such features have been recognised, or 
not, is equally significant.  
The purpose of this chapter is to provide the major findings of this study and to 
proffer some proposals towards improving the potential to realise the objectives of 
the Charter which is to strengthen the role of local government. It will begin with a 
discussion of the major findings before discussing the proposals.  
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4.2 Major findings of the study 
It was argued in chapter 2 that the potential of a system of local government to 
realise benefits usually associated with decentralisation partly depends on its design. 
The basic features of the design of a developmental system of local government 
were identified in chapter 2 as: the security of existence; democratic governance at 
the local level; assignment of relevant and significant powers and functions to local 
government; the decentralisation of revenue generating and expenditure powers; 
supervision; intergovernmental cooperation as well as the definition of 
decentralisation in context. It was contended throughout this paper that without these 
basic features the potential of a local government system to realise benefits 
associated with decentralisation is minimal. Thus the question of whether the Charter 
provides these features and the nature of recognition is significant, as stated above. 
The major findings of this study with regards to these features will be presented in 
this section. 
4.2.1 Security of existence of local governments  
Chapter 2 proposed that the existence of local government as an institution should 
be guaranteed preferably by a constitutional provision. As observed in the previous 
chapter, the Charter only provided for the recognition of local government in ordinary 
legislation. The implication of this is that ordinary legislation provides a lesser 
safeguard since national legislation is easier to amend than constitutions. Chapter 2 
also highlighted the importance of providing a certain measure of security of 
existence to each local unit. A certain level of protection to each municipal unit can 
be assured by empowering affected communities, local authorities, traditional 
institutions and an independent body to participate in decision-making processes 
relating to matters such as the redefinition of municipal boundaries, establishment 
and disestablishment of local units. There is an element of protection afforded to 
individual municipal units under the Charter since the geographical boundaries of 
municipalities can only be amended in terms of what is provided for in law and there 
is a need to consult local authorities before such decisions can be made. However, 
this does not amount to adequate protection since there is no explicit role for 
concerned communities, traditional authorities or the involvement of an independent 
body in the decision-making processes affecting the existence of local units. 
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Therefore, with regard to this latter aspect of security of existence, the Charter falls 
short. 
4.2.2 Democratic local governance 
One of the key arguments of this paper has been that a developmental system of 
local government is one that guarantees democratic local governance. Thus, it was 
argued in chapter 2 that a decentralisation programme should provide for directly 
elected local representatives, the direct participation of communities in local 
governance processes and measures to promote all forms of accountability. The 
Charter requires the direct election of local leaders under an electoral system which 
guarantees regular, free and fair elections. Member states are also mandated by the 
Charter to have legislation that provides meaningful participation mechanisms which 
communities may use to participate in local government. The Charter also requires 
the establishment of other accountability mechanisms besides democratic elections. 
Thus, in as far as democratic local governance is concerned; the Charter should be 
commended for providing the foundation for democratic local governance on the 
continent.  
4.2.3 Powers and functions 
International literature suggests that what local government can achieve partially 
depends on the powers and functions which they have. Thus it was contended in 
chapter 2 that local governments should be assigned significant and relevant powers 
and functions which are afforded the highest level of protection against 
recentralisation. The Charter recognises the need for the principle of subsidiarity to 
inform the assignment of powers and functions between sphere/tiers in particular by 
ensuring that decision-making should generally take place at the lowest level of 
government, unless there is justified cause for it to take place at higher levels. 
Nevertheless, the Charter provides that the assignment of powers and functions to 
local government should take place through national legislation. The disadvantage of 
protection in the national legislation is that it can be easily amended, therefore 
exposing local government powers to easy recentralisation.254 The Charter also fails 
to expressly highlight that the powers and functions should not just be relevant and 
significant, but also clearly demarcated to promote the effective use of resources and 
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ensure that accountability lines are not blurred. In respect of administrative powers, 
the Charter provides that municipalities should have the authority to hire and fire its 
personnel as well as powers to mould or adjust their respective administrative 
structures and procedures to meet their local needs and environments. This should 
be applauded since administrative authority is also crucial to what local government 
can achieve.  
4.2.4 Revenue mobilising and expenditure powers 
The importance of fiscal autonomy in the execution of local government’s powers 
and functions was effectively underscored in this paper. The Charter recognises this 
importance as it provides for the need to decentralise taxing powers, allocate 
intergovernmental grants, assign borrowing powers as well as other resource 
revenue initiatives such as public-private partnerships to local government. However, 
the Charter does not adequately guarantee the fiscal autonomy of local government 
since it does not explicitly require the assignment of powers to determine tax rates to 
the local level, neither is there provision for ensuring that municipalities have viable 
tax bases demarcating local boundaries, as discussed in Chapter 2. In overall, the 
fiscal system provided for in the Charter has great potential to fulfil among other 
objectives, the Charter’s objective of local governments mobilising resources to 
effectively perform their functions.  
4.2.5 Supervision 
Unsupervised exercise of local autonomy is likely to have adverse consequences on 
the realisation of national and local goals. It was therefore contended in Chapter 2 
that higher levels of government should supervise local governments to protect and 
promote these goals. Such supervisory powers should however be limited and 
regulated to protect local autonomy. Four forms of supervision namely; regulation, 
monitoring, support and intervention were identified in this paper. The Charter 
recognises these forms to a varying degree. While the Charter provides the need to 
establish a regulatory framework for local governments it nonetheless fails to 
highlight the principle that the framework should not go to the core of the powers and 
functions of local government. A regulatory framework that goes to the core of local 
government powers and functions constrains the flexibility of local government to 
adjust policies to be in line with local needs and preferences. The Charter also 
provides the need to establish monitoring mechanisms. The Charter adequately 
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provides for monitoring mechanisms in respect of finances, performance, ethical 
behaviour and participation amongst others. The Charter also requires central 
governments to provide various kinds of support to local government. This is 
commendable as support assists municipalities to exercise their powers and perform 
their functions effectively. Perhaps one of the biggest weaknesses of the Charter is 
that it fails to regulate central government intervention in local affairs even though 
intervention is the most intrusive form of supervision. Unchecked intervention powers 
might result in this form of supervision being used for political reasons and not to 
address the genuine or justifiable interests. In light of the supervisory feature, the 
Charter fails to balance the need for local autonomy and the requirement of 
supervision.   
4.2.6 Intergovernmental cooperation 
Intergovernmental cooperation was identified in this paper as a cardinal principle in 
the institutional design of any developmental system of local government. It is 
important because among other things for the development of intergovernmental 
policies, to help facilitate different levels of government to engage when there is a 
need for different spheres to deliver as one government and if there is need to 
navigate around overlapping areas of powers and functions. Intergovernmental 
cooperation is a central feature of the Charter. The Charter requires the 
establishment of mechanisms that facilitate cooperation between the different levels 
of government as well as horizontal cooperation among the municipalities 
themselves. Thus, the Charter is going to have a positive impact on local 
government in Africa in this regard. 
4.2.7 Defining decentralisation in context 
Countries all over the African continent are characterised by different political, social 
and economic environments. These differences also exist within these countries. It is 
against this background that it was argued in chapter 2 that decentralisation should 
be defined and designed in context to take into account these differences. The 
Charter recognises the importance of defining decentralisation within a context. For 
instance, the Charter acknowledges the existence of rural-urban disparities within 
countries. It provides that historically marginalised groups in rural areas should be 
given priority in service delivery and pro-poor initiatives. Nevertheless, the Charter 
fails to explicitly recognise the role of traditional leaders in local government despite 
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their relevance in most parts of Africa. The absence of such recognition might 
endanger the success of decentralisation as traditional leaders can resist and 
destabilise local governance as was the case in Mozambique in the 1990s and 
Zimbabwe, soon after independence.255 Similarly, relegating the institution of 
traditional leaders may be counterproductive given that it is the immediate form of 
local government in certain parts of Africa where the modern state has a limited 
presence.256 The role of traditional leaders in local government on the African 
continent therefore requires urgent attention.  
4.3 Answering the research question 
The main research question which this study sought to answer is ‘Can the specific 
provisions of the African Charter on the Values and Principles of Decentralisation, 
Local Governance and Local Development actually deliver on its laudable goals?’ In 
answering the main question, the study also sought to answer the following sub-
question; ‘What are the basic principles that facilitate effective local government to 
deliver services?’ The initial hypothesis given in chapter 1 was that the Charter 
provides to a great extent an effective legal and institutional framework for 
decentralisation that enables local governments to deliver on service delivery and 
the development mandate. The basic principles of a developmental system of local 
government were proposed in chapter 2. It is clear from the above findings that the 
Charter provides to a great extent an effective developmental system of local 
government that fulfils the objectives of the Charter. However, its main weakness is 
that the Charter does not sufficiently guarantee for local autonomy. This is reflected 
by, among other ways, the inadequate protection of local powers and functions, and 
the non-regulation and limitation of supervisory powers. The Charter also fails to 
explicitly recognise the role of traditional authorities despite their relevance in most 
parts of Africa. Thus the impact of the Charter on local governance on the continent 
may be constrained by these weaknesses. The question then is what is the way 
forward?  
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4.4 Recommendation  
The weaknesses of the Charter have been identified above. If member countries of 
the AU ratify and subsequently implement the African Charter on Decentralisation in 
its current form, the role of local government may be enhanced although not fully. 
The service delivery and developmental challenges currently being experienced on 
the continent can be tackled more effectively if the weaknesses of the Charter are 
addressed. It is suggested that the Charter should be amended to address the 
weaknesses identified in this research paper. Particular attention should be given to 
the protection of the institution of local government by the constitution; recognition of 
significant, clear and relevant local powers and functions in the constitutions; 
recognition of the role of traditional authorities where they are applicable; and limiting 
and regulating the use of supervisory powers especially the power to intervene in 
local affairs. Such reform process, which is likely to encounter political challenges at 
continental level, should be followed by the full implementation of the Charter by 
member countries. In its current state, the Charter nevertheless represents an 
important milestone in as far as the development of effective systems of local 
government on the African continent is concerned. 
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